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UCPR rule 687 – exercise of discretion to fix costs – applicable principles  
 
Although the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) have always included a power 
for the court to order a party to pay an amount for costs to be fixed by the court, until recently 
the power was rarely used in the higher courts.  
 
In light of recent practice directions, and the changes to the procedures for assessment of costs 
contained in the new Chapter 17A of the UCPR, this is no longer the case. The judgment of 
Mullins J in ASIC v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 9 provides some helpful 
guidance for practitioners about the principles which might be applied.  
 
Background 
 
In 2003 an order had been made appointing the applicants as investigative accountants in 
relation to a number of unregistered managed investment schemes conducted by corporations 
under the control of the respondents and to provide a report to the Court. The respondents 
were to pay the applicants’ costs and remuneration for work in accordance with the order as 
agreed or determined by the Court.  
 
After filing their report the applicants applied to the Court for approval of their remuneration 
and disbursements in an amount of $204,287.91. The respondents delivered a notice of 
objection which comprised 696 separate objections.  
 
Mullins J heard the application between 2 and 4 February 2004, and approved the applicants’ 
remuneration in an amount totalling $201,193.61: ASIC v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd 
[2004] QSC 133.  
 
On 7 September 2004 she ordered that the respondents pay the applicants’ costs of the 
application, to be assessed on the standard basis up to the date of service on the applicants 
of the respondents’ notice of objection and from that date onwards on the indemnity basis: 
ASIC v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 284.  
 
The indemnity costs were ordered because of the approach of the respondents as reflected in 
their notice of objection and the consequent effect on the work required by the applicants in 
response. 
 
In November 2004 the applicants filed a costs statement in relation to the costs payable under 
the order. They claimed a total amount for costs and disbursements of $91,387.45 for 766 
items.  
 
The respondents served a notice of objection in December 2004 that set out 648 objections. 
One of the issues raised by the objections was argued as a preliminary point before the 
registrar but on subsequent application for directions Mullins J determined the issue in favour 
of the applicants (ASIC v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 152) and her decision 
was confirmed on appeal: ASIC v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 540. 
 
After re-listing, some of the assessment of the costs statement took place over 5 days before 
a senior deputy registrar in July 2007, but the assessment was adjourned part heard, with the 
further days required unlikely to be available until 2008. 
 
Changes to procedures for cost assessment 
 
Supreme Court Practice Direction No 3 of 2007 was issued on 8 May 2007. It was intended to 
encourage parties to agree on the amount of costs otherwise to be assessed, and in reliance 
on then r 685(2) of the UCPR to signal the authority of the court, in an appropriate case, to fix 
costs, and to ensure parties are in a position to inform that process. 
 
A further Practice Direction, No 7 of 2007, was issued on 28 June 2007 concerning interim 
arrangements for costs assessments. By a notification used on 3 October 2007, the Chief 
Justice confirmed that amendments to the UCPR were in process of preparation and that it 
was intended that assessments would be carried out by costs assessors drawn from a panel 
of experienced lawyers established by the Court rather than by a registrar.  
 
The notification also confirmed that the procedure set out in Practice Direction No 7 of 2007 
should be followed for all assessment matters currently with the registry, including those part 
heard and those for which hearing dates had been set into the future. 
 
In light of the Practice Directions and notification, the applicants filed an application on 16 
November 2007 seeking an order that their costs of their application for approval of their 
remuneration and disbursements be fixed in the amount of $89, 260.70.  
 
The application was originally brought in reliance on r 685 of the UCPR, but on 10 December 
2007 relevant provisions of the Uniform Civil Procedure Amendment Rule (No 4) 2007 
commenced.  
 
These replaced the existing Chapter 17 part 2 and Chapter 17A of the UCPR with a new 
chapter 17A.  
 
The relevant rule in the new Chapter 17A supporting the application is r 687 which is in 
identical terms to the former r 685. Rule 687(2) confers power on the court to fix costs in a 
specified amount. 
 
It was necessary for the Court to determine whether it should fix the costs to be paid by the 
respondents to the applicants under the costs order, and if so, what should be the amount of 
those fixed costs. 
 
Exercise of discretion to fix costs – general principles 
 
The respondents extracted from authorities, particularly from the Federal Court and the New 
South Wales Supreme Court, a number of statements as relevant to the exercise by the Court 
of the discretion to make a fixed costs or gross sum order. Mullins J took from those 
submissions a number of statements which she regarded as of general application and 
providing guidance on the circumstances where it may be appropriate for the Court to award 
fixed costs and the process that should be undertaken in doing so, namely: 
 
“(a) the purpose of making a gross sum order is to save the parties the time, trouble, 
delay and expense and aggravation in protracted litigation arising out of taxation: 
Learly v Leary [1871] 1 WLR 72, 76 (Leary) and Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 
2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 (Beach Petroleum); 
 
(b) the specification of a gross sum order is not the result of a process of taxation or 
assessment of costs: Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738, 743, [22] (Harrison); 
 
(c) the power to make a gross sum order should be exercised only when the Court 
considers that it can do so fairly between the parties, and that includes sufficient 
evidence in arriving at an appropriate sum on the materials available: Wentworth v 
Wentworth (Court of Appeal (NSW) 21 February 1996, unreported, per Clarke JA and 
referred to in Harrison at [22]; 
 
(d) the gross sum can only be fixed broadly having regard to the information before the 
Court: Beach Petroleum at 124 and Harrison at [22];  
 
(e) expert evidence analysing the bills of costs and/or giving an opinion about the likely 
outcome of the taxation has been utilised by the Court in making the gross sum order: 
Beach Petroleum at 121;  
 
(f) the Court should be confident in fixing the amount of the gross fee that the 
approach taken to estimate costs is logical, fair and reasonable: Beach Petroleum at 
123; 
(g) the power to order gross sum amounts is appropriate to be used in complex cases: 
Beach Petroleum at 120; 
 
(h) the Court must be astute to prevent prejudice to the party ordered to pay the costs 
by overestimating the costs, but must also be astute not to cause an injustice to the 
successful party by an arbitrary “failsafe” discount on the cost estimates submitted to 
the Court: Beach Petroleum at 124; 
 
(i) the power to order a gross sum may appropriately be exercised where the 
assessment of costs would be protracted and expensive, and in particular if it appears 
that the party obliged to pay the costs would not be able to meet a liability of the order 
likely to result from the assessment: Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc [2000] FCA 
628 at [25] and Harrison at [21].” 
 
Mullins J observed that the authorities referred to in the respondents’ submissions provided 
many different examples of when the power to order fixed costs was exercised, and that the 
discretion had been exercised in both extremely complex matters (Beech Petroleum) and in 
extremely simple matters (Keen v Telstra Corporation Limited (No 2) [2006] FCA 930). 
 
Her Honour noted the submissions for the applicants included reliance on the approach to the 
assessment for indemnity costs taken by the Chief Justice in Bottoms v Reser (unreported, 
Cairns SC no 28 of 1998, 29.11.2000) at 5, and referred to with approval by the Court of 
Appeal in Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2007] 235 at [29], including the view that on 
such an assessment “no niggardly or unduly narrow approach would be warranted.”  
 
She said that although the statements in these cases were made in the context of assessing, 
rather than fixing costs, the principle that there is greater latitude in determining 
reasonableness of costs an indemnity basis than on a standard basis and usually only costs 
that can be characterised as outlandish should be excluded on an indemnity basis may result 
in the Court being more inclined to fix costs that are claimed on an indemnity basis where it is 
apparent the costs are not outlandish. 
 
The applicants had sought to rely on the conduct of the respondents in the application that 
resulted in the costs order, in addition to the respondents’ approach to the assessment of the 
costs under the costs order, whereas the respondents submitted the only relevant evidence 
was the history of the assessment. Mullins J found that the court was entitled to consider all 
the circumstances (Harrison at [21]), and was not restricted to material that could be relied on 
at an assessment of costs. 
 
Application 
 
Mullins J examined the evidence before her given by affidavit by the solicitor who had the 
conduct of the proceeding on behalf of the applicants including the application that resulted in 
the costs order, and the ensuing steps taken by or on behalf of the applicants in an attempt 
obtain the benefit of that costs order.  
 
She said the respondents were putting the same “unrelenting opposition” to the quantification 
of the applicants’ costs of the approval application as they had put to the applicants’ original 
application for approval of their remuneration and expenses, and found this to be a compelling 
factor for exercising the discretion to fix the costs. 
 
The respondents had not offered to settle the costs claimed in the costs statement, or 
indicated an amount they were prepared to pay under the costs order. Although there was no 
requirement by any rule of court or practice direction to do so, Mullins J said that the failure to 
do so added weight to the desirability of the Court bringing the quantification of the costs order 
to an immediate conclusion. 
 
The judge J noted that the respondents would not lose the small benefit of the part of the 
assessment which had progressed before the registrar as the applicants had conceded those 
items and like items on which the registrar had ruled. 
 
The various categories of objections taken by the respondents were also considered in some 
detail, but Mullins J found that nothing in the matters covered by the objections to be an  
impediment to ordering fixed costs. The objections were primarily directed at costs sought on 
an indemnity basis, and her Honour found it was not apparent from an overview of the 
categories of objections, as they relate to costs claimed on an indemnity basis, that the 
respondents would achieve substantial deductions to that part of the claim for costs.  
 
Her Honour was also satisfied that the costs statement and the affidavit evidence before her 
provided sufficient information for the fixing of costs and that the factors overwhelmingly 
favoured the exercise of the discretion to fix the costs under the costs order.  
 
She ordered that the costs the respondents were ordered to pay by order made in the 
proceeding on 7 September 2004 be fixed in the amount of $84,000. 
